Factors in negotiating overseas by Allen, Daniel William






FACTORS IN NEGOTIATING OVERSEAS
by
Daniel William Allen, Jr.
September 1979
Thesis Advisor: David Burt









2. GOVT ACCESSION NO 1 RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Subtltla)
Factors in Negotiating Overseas
S- TYRE OF REPORT * PERIOD COVERED
Master's Thesis;
September 1979
• • PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
7. AUTMORf*;
Daniel William Allen, Jr.
• CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER^;
I PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME ANO AOORESS
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
10. PROGRAM ELEMENT. PROJECT, TASK
AREA * WORK UNIT NUMBERS





IS. NUMBER OF PAGES
51
14 MONITORING AGENCY NAME a AOORESSC" dlttaranl horn Controlling OtHca) IS. SECURITY CLASS, (ol thia rdport)
Unclassified
11a. DECLASSIFICATION/ DOWN GRADING
SCHEDULE
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (ol thia Xaport)
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (el thm abatraet antatad In Block 30, It dlttarant tram Haporl)
IB. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
1*. KEY WOROS (Contlnua on tavataa alda It nacaaaary and Identity by block numbar)
Department of Defense contract negotiations
NATO Rationalization, Standardization, and Interoperability (RSI)
20. ABSTRACT (Contlnua on ravataa alda It nacaaaary and Idantlty by black mambat)
The Department of Defense has been expanding the volume of
foreign purchases in compliance with directives intended to achieve
our national goals regarding NATO Rationalization, Standardization,
and Interoperability (RSI). Implementation of this "two-way street"
policy entails entensive negotiations at the governmental level in
formulating the Memoranda of Understanding associated with a given




EDITION OF I NOV 6S IS OBSOLETE
S/N 0102-014- 6601 | UNCLASSIFIED
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (•*•»» Data Sntarad)

UNCLASSIFIED
l*euwrv ci AMiric*TiQn gg mn »*Qtn**,m* n*«« *»«•*•*
#2 - ABSTRACT - CONTINUED
direct purchase transactions requiring negotiation between the
U.S. Government and foreign private firms. The purpose of
this study is to identify those factors which may affect the
negotiation process with foreign firms and foreign government
officials. Cultural differences which might influence negotia-
tions are also reviewed. Most findings and conclusions are
based upon personal interviews with U.S. negotiators from both
the public and private sectors who have had extensive experience
in negotiating overseas. The study concludes with some recommen-
dations to help the U.S. Department of Defense contract negotiator
prepare for negotiations overseas.
DD Form 1473
m . 1 Jan 73 UNCLASSIFIEDS/N 0102-014-6601 SCCuaiTv clamification o* tmi« »AOcr»».- o*

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited
Factors in Negotiating Overseas
by
Daniel William Allen, Jr.
Lieutenant Commander, Supply Corps, U.S. Navy
B.A. , Cornell University, 1966
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of







The Department of Defense has been expanding the volume of
foreign purchases in compliance with directives intended to
achieve our national goals regarding NATO Rationalization,
Standardization, and Interoperability (RSI) . Implementation
of this "two-way street" policy entails extensive negotiations
at the governmental level in formulating the Memoranda of
Understanding associated with a given transaction. Also,
there have been increases in the volume of direct purchase
transactions requiring negotiation between the U.S. Government
and foreign private firms. The purpose of this study is to
identify those factors which may affect the negotiation pro-
cess with foreign firms and foreign government officials.
Cultural differences which might influence negotiations are
also reviewed. Most findings and conclusions are based upon
personal interviews with U.S. negotiators from both the public
and private sectors who have had extensive experience in
negotiating overseas. The study concludes with some recommen-
dations to help the U.S. Department of Defense contract
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The classical theory of international trade rests firmly
on the premise of mutual comparative advantage, i.e., that
both nations will benefit after an exchange takes places.
Benefits accrue because one nation enjoys an advantage in
producing something which the other nation needs. His-
torically, various forms of mercantilism, isolationism and
nationalism have resulted in significant barriers to free
trade. Many of these trade barriers developed during the
last two hundred years as nations experienced varying degrees
of industrial revolution. [1:163-196] While quotas, tariffs
and other "beggar-thy-neighbor" policies have greatly inhi-
bited the volume of world trade, various international trade
agreements (e.g., European Common Market) and a quantum increase
in consumer demand for products from foreign suppliers have
resulted in a tremendous growth in world trade. A quick tour
through a large American department store will clearly illus-
trate this growth as one finds a great variety of high quality
electronics items made in Japan and Holland, clothing made
in Korea, cameras from Germany, shoes from Italy, English
tweeds, French perfume, etc. The purchase of consumer goods
from foreign producers is vitally important in today's market-
place.

Governmental agencies such as the U.S. Department of
Defense (DOD) have moved rather cautiously into this world
marketplace. For many years it has been assumed that only
domestic firms possessed the technical expertise to manufac-
ture the complex weapon systems considered vital to U.S.
defense. Consequently, the role of the DOD in the inter-
national marketplace essentially has been limited to exporting,
particularly as a sort of catalyst in the Foreign Military
Sales (FMS) arena. As the volume of FMS dollars continued
to grow, foreign governments became more and more concerned
about the one way flow in this trading process.
President Carter recognized this concern and the political
implications of the DOD propensity to export but reluctance
to import. It was at this point that he addressed the NATO
leaders at the May, 1977 Summit Meeting in London. The
President stated in part:
As we strengthen our forces, we should also
improve cooperation in development, production,
and procurement of alliance defense equipment.
The alliance should not be weakened militarily
by waste and overlapping. Nor should it be
weakened politically by disputes over where to
buy defense equipment.
. . . We must make a major effort— to eliminate
waste and duplication between national programs;
to provide each of our countries an opportunity
to develop
,
produce and sell competitive defense
equipment; to maintain technological excellence
in all allied combat forces.
. . . We are eager to join with you in trying
to identify opportunities for joint development
of new equipment and for increased licensing
or direct purchase of equipment that has already
been developed. [2:6]

The DOD reinforced the President's policy regarding joint
development and direct purchasing from our NATO allies by
providing guidance and goals to achieve Rationalization,
Standardization, and Interoperability (RSI) in new acquisi-
tions. [3:1-2]
The impact of this policy guidance is very clear as many
contract negotiators have begun to realize. Obviously, the
contract negotiator involved in Weapon Systems Acquisition
within DOD now has much broader horizons in seeking out new
sources of supply from overseas for the many NATO systems
and subsystems. Those contract negotiators who currently
handle subcontracts for the major DOD prime contractors also
have been affected by this policy as they are now obliged to
solicit proposals from foreign firms under various international
programs. Even the DOD field purchasing offices are affected
because foreign made systems require logistics support leading
to the acquisition of many foreign made parts.
For many American contract negotiators, the acquisition
process in dealing with foreign suppliers will seem mysteri-
ous and cumbersome simply because of differences in the
business philosophies and cultural backgrounds of the two
parties. A vital ingredient and potential headache within
the acquisition process is negotiation. As Gerard Nierenberg
so aptly stated:
We must negotiate so that our opposer will
reveal himself to us. We seek to recognize
his needs, his motives, and his desires. We
accomplish this by asking questions, by noting

/
his mannerisms and context of speech, by
observing his telltale gestures and other
nonverbal communication, by allowing for
emotional stresses and cultural differ-
ences. (4:146)
Presumably, an effective contract negotiator in the
international acquisition arena requires some insight into
the special factors or jvuances which might be encountered
within this environment. And that is what this study is all
about.
B. NEGOTIATION
The concept of negotiation is probably as old as time
itself. In its broadest sense, negotiation is a process which
occurs whenever two or more people exchange ideas with the
intention of changing their relationship. [4:2] The process
might be as simple as the case in which two children are
trading baseball cards, as fundamental as the case of a young
sailor bargaining for a night's entertainment in Wanchai (Hong
Kong) , or as complex as the case in which two major world
powers are considering mutual limitations in strategic
armaments
.
Sales negotiations involve a buyer and seller who generally
attempt to change their relationship by agreeing to trade
money for some product or service. As society advances tech-
nologically, products become much more complex and marketing
efforts often extend beyond national boundaries. At this
point the relative skill of the individuals conducting the
negotiations becomes a vital factor in formulating the terms
of the sales agreement or contract.
10

C. SCOPE OF RESEARCH
The primary purpose of this research paper is to identify
those factors which affect international contract negotia-
tions. Because of national differences in culture, business
philosophy, and governmental relationships with private
industry, negotiations between individuals from different
nations tend to be more complex than negotiations (for a
similar product) between two individuals from the same coun-
try. While this contention is based somewhat on intuition,
casual observation of the many special problems associated
with international purchasing in general and with various
NATO rationalization, standardization, and interoperability
(RSI) programs in particular would strongly support this
presumption.
After confirming that differences do exist, an attempt
will be made to identify them and to distinguish which nuances
apply to which NATO countries. Basic negotiation concepts
and strategies will not be discussed in detail as it is pre-
sumed that the reader already will have had some exposure to
the classical negotiation theories such as those of Nierenberg,
McDonald, and Karrass. [4,5,6] Also, it is presumed that the
reader will have had some purchasing or marketing experience




This research was based on two primary methods: literature




with a review of various government documents and research
papers dealing with international programs. In this regard
it was noted that during the past two decades there has been
considerable European experience in collaborative acquisitions
The primary participants have been England, France, Germany,
and Holland who, in the aggregate, have accounted for more
than 75% of non-U. S. NATO defense expenditures. [7:2] Addi-
tional literature was then reviewed to identify significant
historical events in the cultural development of Germany,
England, France, and Holland. Finally, the literature search
uncovered several texts dealing with non-verbal communications
which relate to various national characteristics.
Personal interviews were conducted with government per-
sonnel involved with international programs and with repre-
sentatives from the private sector who were involved in
marketing U.S. products overseas or purchasing foreign pro-
ducts from European suppliers. While most of these interviews
were conducted in person in a relatively unstructured environ-
ment lasting one to three hours, many contacts of shorter
duration were made by telephone.
E. THESIS STRUCTURE
Beyond this introduction, the research has been broken
down into four sections. Chapter II deals with the Memorandum
of Understanding (MOU) , which is a form of international
agreement between two or more governments. Usually a separate
MOU is negotiated for each RSI or cooperative research and
development program. While the level of detail varies from
12

program to program, the MOU generally provides a framework
from which program objectives, specific obligations, and
legal doctrines are develped. [8:44] Chapter III concerns
negotiation factors in overseas purchasing within the private
sector. Chapters II and III are provided to establish a
general framework from which specific differences can be
developed. Chapter IV continues to identify negotiation
factors and cultural differences on an individual country
basis. Specific examples are also reviewed to illustrate
these differences in negotiating overseas. While much of
this research deals with techniques in purchasing from foreign
firms, some of the negotiation factors have been derived
from analysis of marketing techniques employed by U.S. firms
selling to foreign firms. Finally, Chapter V integrates
these findings and offers various conclusions and recommenda-
tions in an attempt to assist a U.S. contract negotiator in




II. THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
A. PARTICIPANTS
Since the MOU is negotiated entirely within the public
sector of each participant, it is useful to establish whether
or not differences exist between intragovernmental and inter-
governmental negotiations. To what extent are all bureau-
crats basically the same? This question was presented to
all U.S. government employees interviewed and the concensus
of opinion definitely supported the contention that special
factors must be considered in negotiating with foreign govern-
ment personnel. Since national goals are not uniform and
since the structure of each bureaucracy varies from country
to country, the motivation of the negotiator will tend to
reflect these differences.
Although some contact was made with U.S. State Department
personnel who are involved in a wide range of international
agreements, most of the public sector people interviewed are
employed by the Department of Defense and have been active
participants in negotiating defense related agreements with
personnel from various foreign ministries of defense.
B. CONTENT OF MOU
MOU negotiations are quite complex and the resultant
document covers many topics. Before considering special
negotiation factors, it is necessary to recognize the issues




Since many related agreements impact on the program to
be covered by the MOU, these existing agreements must be




(3) Data exchange agreements
(4) Reciprocal audit agreements
(5) General NATO agreements
(6) Previous research and development agreements
Any laws or regulations which might affect the proposed
program should be incorporated into the MOU. For example, the
treatment of employee inventions, import and export regula-
tions, personnel regulations, and statutory inspection require-
ments should be considered.
Special terms which apply to the program must be defined.
In some cases previously developed NATO glossaries can be
used but often the negotiating teams must develop a special
glossary for each specific program. This process sometimes
leads to special problems which will be discussed in Section
C.
Because of differences in perceived threat or doctrine,
it is essential to clearly identify the program objectives
in the MOU. The objectives should be realistic since subse-
quent modification usually entails a lengthy review process
with formal amendment executed at the same level as that of
15

the original MOU. Implementation of the objectives requires
establishment of a management organization whose duties are
clearly defined. The MOU usually provides for some method
of resolving disputes between different factions within these
management organizations. Negotiating this procedure requires
a great deal of tactful diplomacy as many emotional issues
arise. However, failure to establish an efficient and effec-
tive system to resolve disputes will doom the entire program
eventually.
Allocation of program costs and specific obligations of
the participants should be delineated. Specific areas nor-
mally covered in this section of the MOU include:
(1) Cost contributions, both total and annual
(2) Work tasks expressed in terms of manpower
(3) Termination liability
(4) Offset purchase agreements
(5) Currency exchange rate determination
(6) Funding mechanics
(7) Administrative support responsibilities
(8) Preparation and language of annual reports
As a cooperative program progresses, much technical data
will be generated. Thus, the MOU must specify the rights
of the participants regarding use and disclosure of this data.
Obviously, if the technical information is not protected from
unauthorized use by non-participants, the desire to partici-
pate will diminish and fewer countries will be left to share




expense prior to a contract award should be identified by
developing an initial status report prior to initiation of
the cooperative effort. However, because of differences in
the way certain foreign countries view background rights, the
MOU must provide a uniform method of treatment. Licensing
rights should also be identified since royalty entitlements
vary from country to country.
In any major program there is a real need for personnel
exchanges and visits from country to country. In this
regard it is the MOU that normally addresses the extent to
which travel will be authorized and it often places specific
restrictions on the visitors. These restrictions may involve
data disclosure limitations or even the extent or freedom of
movement at the program site. Generally, funding responsi-
bilities and liabilities for injuries are also identified
in this section of the MOU.
If the project is to be classified, then the MOU must
identify the level of classification and the procedures for
handling, storing, and transmitting the classified material.
The second type of MOU deals with purchases to be made
by the U.S. Government from foreign firms either directly or
via the foreign government. In addition to the many aspects
of the codevelopment MOU previously discussed, the direct
purchase MOU includes guidelines for contract terms and
conditions. Some other aspects of the direct purchase MOU
include additional definitions, specifications, acceptance,
17

cost reimbursements and claims liability. The additional
terms which need to be defined include:
(1) Related supplies (associated weapons, test
equipment, spare parts, and technical
publications)
,
(2) Engineering Change Proposal (ECP) (method of
incorporating modifications into the
weapon system)
,
(3) Contract (identifying the principal parties)
.
[8:60]
With regard to the specifications, the MOU is generally
quite vague. However, citing of the baseline configuration
specifications in the MOU does help to accomplish the RSI
objective since subsequent ECP ' s could then be required to
maintain interchangeability with the baseline configuration.
The acceptance procedures specified in the MOU normally
reflect a compromise between the standard domestic rules
and the foreign government's normal procedures. Cost reim-
bursements are often discussed in much greater detail in a
direct purchase MOU, since certain items such as Research
and Development costs require special treatment as to the
rate and basis for recoupment. Liability for third party
claims is also covered in this type of MOU.
C. MOU NEGOTIATION FACTORS
While it is important to understand the peculiar nature
and special nuances relating to MOU negotiations , it is
,
perhaps, even more significant to recognize the danger of
generalizations regarding negotiation techniques. The following
18

comments about MOU negotiations are based on actual situations
experienced by the people who were interviewed. However,
each negotiation session is truly unique as some nuances are
based on individual personalities or even on the mood and
interaction of the negotiators during a particular session.
Thus, the effective negotiator must be perceptive enough to
recognize which of these situations seem to apply and then
be flexible enough to capitalize on them.
In order to make any meaningful progress in negotiating
an MOU r both negotiating teams must first develop confidence
in one another. Contrary to domestic negotiation scenarios
in which the two sides might initially vie for power and con-
trol over the negotiations, in MOU negotiations there seems
to be a preconceived suspicion that the giant U.S. defense
establishment will draw upon its immense power to steamroller
its allies into meek submission. Rather than vie for power
with such a formidable adversary, our NATO allies tend to
withdraw, maintain their suspicions, and move very slowly
towards any definitive agreements. Despite the recent
devaluations of the dollar relative to the European curren-
cies, these deeply ingrained suspicions have not subsided.
Overcoming this suspicion does take time but the process can
be accelerated if the U.S. negotiator is scrupulously honest
and makes a special effort to conduct negotiations in a frank
and open manner. Having a permanent U.S. team of professional
MOU negotiators is obviously an excellent means of overcoming
19

this initial mistrust since most of our allies already have
permanent teams (or at least a permanent nucleus from which
particular teams are formed) . Then, once a high level of
confidence has been achieved, it will not be necessary to
rebuild the confidence bridge each time a new program is
developed.
Eloquent language is fine for playwrites. U.S. "Federalese"
,
while not so fine, is at least pretty well understood through-
out the U.S. Federal government. Translation, however, tends
to_become hopelessly rUsto*^^ if ^h** ^t-j gi nal text is not
short and concise. Besides the translation difficulties,
the foreign negotiators will probably have a great deal of
trouble understanding the "Federalese" and the suspicions
mentioned earlier will not dissipate. Because the negotiators
represent their sovereign governments in MOU negotiations,
diplomacy requires that the resulting document be written
in more than one language. The translation process is very
time consuming because accuracy and elegance are sometimes
mutually exclusive qualities, particularly if the English
version is written in "Federalese". In trying to reach a
true "meeting of the minds", the procedure entails much play-
back and fine tuning. Here's a typical example. The English
version is translated into German by the Germans. Then the
German version is translated into English by an American who
is often a language scholar with no idea of what the program
is all about. Finally the U.S. negotiator gets the two English
20

versions and attempts to resolve the differences. Considerable
effort must be expended with successive rounds of translation
until the two English versions are almost identical. The
astute U.S. negotiator should soon recognize this whole
process is of little value if there is a clear understanding
that only one language can be the "original" document. Since
negotiations are usually conducted in English, that language
is generally accepted for the "original" document. And since
most countries agree that the original document takes prece-
dence in resolving subsequent disputes, accuracy in transla-
tion becomes much less critical.
Because of the lengthy and complex negotiation process
in developing an MOU, it is very important to document the
many sub-agreements at the time the issues are discussed. In
this regard, accurate and timely minutes are essential and
they should be formally agreed upon (i.e., signed) prior to
adjournment of each session. Agreement as to the wording
of the minutes normally requires much discussion and often
takes several hours. But the additional effort expended
during each session should help to keep negotiations moving
along. Without formal minutes, there is a tendency to con-
tinually reopen discussion on points which have already
been agreed upon. Although the host nation might automatically
assume the responsibility for writing the minutes, active
participation by the U.S. team in the wording of the minutes
is generally beneficial, particularly if the original minutes
21

are written in English. Thus, someone on the U.S. team
should be identified as the minutes writer and that individual
should not be assigned any other significant duties which
might be distracting. Expert stenographic talent is not
required. A logical synopsis of key statements, positions,
agreements, and disagreements is much more valuable than a
lengthy transcript which has captured every word spoken at
the negotiating table.
Before considering more specific differences in nego-
tiating MOU's with particular NATO countries, a final point
is offered concerning MOU negotiations in general. The
United States is a relatively recent entrant into the NATO
RSI arena. Since many European negotiators have been in this
business for the past 30 years, the smart U.S. negotiator
will keep an open mind and will never underestimate the skill
of his European counterpart.
D . SUMMARY
The MOU provides a basis for development of a business
relationship between two or more governments. Any agreements
written into the MOU concerning direct purchasing procedures
will become significant factors in negotiating contracts
directly with foreign suppliers. Since many U.S. firms have
had a great deal of experience in negotiating with European
suppliers, knowledge of the private sector perception of
negotiation factors in dealing with the Europeans can be




for negotiations in Europe. This experience is discussed
in the next chapter.
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III. NEGOTIATION FACTORS WITHIN THE PRIVATE SECTOR
A. COST EVALUATION
When purchasing from European suppliers, U.S. firms must
carefully evaluate various types of costs which usually are
not encountered in dealing with domestic suppliers. Evalua-
tion is necessary whenever competition exists so that domestic
and foreign offers can be compared on a "true cost" basis.
In a non-competitive environment this evaluation is a necessary
step in preparing for negotiations since many of these costs
can be influenced by establishing special provisions in the
contract.
The first problem concerns the treatment of item cost.
In this case the difficulty is a lack of information, since
most European firms are quite reluctant to provide a detailed
cost breakdown. The European concept of a fair and reasonable
price is tied directly to the marketplace, however imperfect
it may be. "Whatever the market will bear" is often the
sole basis for a European firm's pricing policy. Thus, the
U.S. negotiator must perform an independent price analysis
based on domestic budgetary estimates. The most effective
tactic in dealing with this situation is to generate competi-
tion and not worry about the cost breakdown at all. In man-
datory sole source situations such as directed purchases to
specific sources, the best approach seems to be an appeal for
24

a price reduction based on the purchaser's budgetary limi-
tations (both real and imagined)
.
Another type of cost which is often partially hidden
involves special handling, storage, taxes, and transporta-
tion. Even in a purchase which specifies FOB Destination,
some of these costs still must be considered. For example,
the movement of the material should be monitored to ensure
eventual receipt. This involves additional transportation
specialists and expediters who must make long distance tele-
phone calls or take trips for the major purchases. Since
most European firms operate on an "ex works" or "ex dock"
(FOB Origin) basis, these handling charges, taxes, and various
permit fees become a direct cost for the purchaser. In fact,
there are many European trading terms such as "FAS (Free
Alongside Ship) Vessel" and "C.I.F. (Cost, insurance, freight)
Destination" which are not commonly used in the United States.
These terms are clearly defined in a publication called
INCOTERMS , which is available from the National Committee of
the International Commerce Commission located in New York
City.
Currency exchange arrangements can greatly affect the
bottom line cost to the purchaser. Negotiations are normally
undertaken to determine which currency will be used for
pricing the contract, the timing of the currency exchange,
and the' basis for rate determination. Historically although
the buyer could generally insist on using his own currency
25

for contract pricing, the recent fall of the U.S. dollar
relative to most European currencies has caused many European
suppliers to demand exchange rate guarantees. In effect the
contract is then priced in the supplier's currency and the
buyer must either set up a foreign currency fund pool or else
risk an automatic price change if the actual foreign currency
exchange rate should fluctuate. In some cases a skillful
negotiator can develop a pricing procedure which effectively
shifts a part of the risk of exchange rate fluctuation to
the supplier. The mechanism to accomplish this is simply
a share formula or else a limit on the degree of fluctuation
when computing the amount of foreign currency owed to the
supplier.
In contrast with the private sector, a study of DOD poli-
cies regarding the use of foreign currency in pricing con-
tracts with foreign suppliers was undertaken by the Comp-
troller General of the United States who then strongly recom-
mended that DOD adopt a uniform policy requiring contracting
officers to price these contracts in the foreign currency.
A less preferable but acceptable alternative to this recom-
mendation would be to pay foreign contracts in dollars subject
to price adjustments to compensate for significant exchange
rate fluctuations during the life of the contract. [9:19-20]
Unfortunately, foreign exchange pricing arrangements are
often further complicated by the timing of payment. European
firms tend to have cash flow problems and must frequently
26

assign contract payments to lending institutions. Advance
payments obviate the need to make these assignments and are,
therefore, very desirable to the seller. In fact, many
European suppliers will make significant price concessions
advanced payments are to be made. If the exchange rate
and timing of payment factors are carefully tied together,
the result can be the elimination of exchange rate fluctua-
tion problems and a price reduction in consideration for the
advance payments.
B. TIME CONSIDERATIONS
In general, it takes longer to deal with foreign suppliers
than with domestic suppliers. Since time is often a signifi-
cant factor in negotiating any contract, identification of
the specific reasons which bring about protracted lead times
might help the contract negotiator minimize these delays. The
obvious relationship between time and distance would, in it-
self, suggest longer lead times from foreign suppliers. How-
ever, distance is not the only cause for longer lead times.
Lack of familiarity with U.S. specifications will generally
result in slower response times to U.S. solicitations. The
foreign firm must expend more effort to ensure its offer
meets the U.S. requirements. In many cases the European
firms take longer to respond simply because of their tradi-
tional operating procedures under which a reasonable time
period is apt to be quite a bit longer than that which would
be considered reasonable in the United States.
27

The negotiation process itself is also significantly
longer if the foreign firm has not had extensive exposure to
U.S. business practices and specifications. Many standard
operating procedures identified in the buyer's regular
"boiler plate" clauses must be thoroughly discussed with
European suppliers. American business practices regarding
payment, warranties, liquidated damages also require much
discussion as the treatment of these factors varies from
country to country. Normally, the U.S. negotiator must
establish the extent to which the foreign supplier has pre-
viously complied with applicable U.S. specifications. This
requires a detailed step-by-step review of the specifications
Sometimes the foreign supplier's standard specification meets
or exceeds the U.S. requirement. However, a very detailed
review and comparison is required in order to ascertain the
adequacy of the foreign specification. [10:177]
C. OTHER TERMS AND CONDITIONS
Some other factors which might arise during negotiations
with foreign suppliers include, letter of credit procedures,
default provisions, cancellation limitations, place of juris-
diction, and the procedures for resolving disputes. The
letter of credit mechanism is quite complex and involves
several parties and as many as thirteen steps to complete a
single transaction. Specific letter of credit terms and
conditions should be negotiated and incorporated into the
basic contract in order to preclude misunderstandings during
contract performance. Default clauses often have release
28

provisions in case of a force majeure . Since the determina-
tion of what constitutes a force majeure varies from country
to country, this clause must be carefully worded to protect
the purchaser. Cancellation procedures are especially diffi-
cult to negotiate with European suppliers because of the
supplier's inability to manipulate the size of his labor
force. The issue of jurisdiction is somewhat easier to
resolve in dealing with foreign private firms than with
foreign government agencies. Since the buyer is paying the
bill and thus, providing the money in this transaction, the
buyer can usually persuade the seller that legal jurisdiction
should remain in the state or country in which the buyer is
incorporated. Sometimes, a trade-off takes place because the
seller is very concerned about jurisdiction with regard to
the handling of disputes. Usually a recognized international
arbitration board is designated to resolve disputes. Nego-
tiation of these points is quite complex and much interface
with legal counsel is generally needed to avoid an unfavorable
arrangement.
Trade-offs are commonplace in almost all negotiations,
however, in dealing with foreign suppliers, the quid pro quo
concept is especially important. In some countries, the
"winner" is thought to be the negotiator who gains the most
concessions, regardless of the importance of those concessions
Since the foreign negotiator treats all concessions as equal,
the U.S. negotiator should ensure that many issues are intro-
duced. Then concessions can be offered or exchanged in an
29

attempt to win the big points and yield on the little points.
For example, a French supplier might insist that the speci-
fication be modified to provide that "MADE IN FRANCE" be
etched into the item's casing. If the American negotiator
is concerned about the delivery schedule, a very painful
liquidated damages clause could be presented in exchange for
this minor (but emotional) specification change. When used
effectively, both sides feel as though they have won at the
negotiation table. [10: 175] One must always look for emo-
tional issues which might yield valuable concessions on sub-
stantive issues. Of course, the skilled U.S. negotiator
must fully understand the foreign business practices and
cultural influences on negotiations in order to recognize
which issues will yield the best concessions.
D . SUMMARY
Many American firms have turned to foreign sources to
enjoy cost savings and derive some benefits from foreign
technology. However, cost determination requires careful
analysis and the additional administrative and production
leadtimes must be considered. Also, dealing with European
firms can require a compromise concerning legal jurisdiction
for arbitration for disputes and cancellation procedures.
Since emphasis on these factors and general negotiation
techniques vary from country to country, it is important
to recognize the differences between German, French, British,
and Dutch negotiators. This is the subject of Chapter IV.
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IV. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN COUNTRIES
A. INTRODUCTION
1. Public Versus Private Sector
Before discussing the way in which specific cultural
differences affect the negotiation process, some distinction
between public and private sector negotiations is necessary.
The primary distinction rests on the public sector concept of
sovereign equality versus the private sector's economic
marketplace orientation. Thus, public sector negotiations
cannot rest on a single sovereign's framework of rules and
regulations , but instead will always involve some mixture or
blending of two sets of rules. In public sector negotiations,
political considerations are paramount, while in the private
sector, economic considerations prevail. Thus, public sector
negotiations involve many more emotional issues and protocol
becomes very important. For example, most of the private
sector negotiators had very few language problems in dealing
with European firms because all negotiations were conducted
in English and the contract was written in English. Although
the public sector negotiations were frequently conducted in
English, a great deal of time was spent preparing and altering




There are a few points which seem to apply to nego-
tiations with all European countries. For example, it is
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important to avoid embarrassing any members of the foreign
negotiating team. While this might seem obvious, it must
be remembered that it is very easy to embarrass someone with-
out realizing it, particularly if the foreign customs are
not fully understood. To minimize misunderstandings, the
U.S. negotiator should always use clear and simple language
and repeat important points often, using slightly different
phraseology each time. [ll:XV-2] Frequent caucuses are
especially useful in negotiating overseas as the caucuses
help to relieve tension. [12:30] Finally, some appreciation
for the way Europeans tend to view Americans could be helpful
in overcoming a stereotyped image. A recent study in public
opinion revealed the following perceptions of Americans by
Europeans
.
Nationality Adjectives most frequently used to describe Americans
British Progressive Conceited Generous
French Practical Progressive Domineering
German Progressive Generous Practical
Dutch Practical Progressive Hardworking [13:51]
B . GERMANY
In reviewing several detailed studies of German culture
and heritage, several general observations regarding German
characteristics emerge. Germans project an air of formality
among themselves as well as among foreigners. For example,
there is apt to be much more handshaking than most Americans
are accustomed to. Also, the American habit of gum chewing
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still horrifies the older Germans even though the habit is
growing in popularity among the youth in Germany. [14:50]
With regard to youth, it should be noted that the tendency
towards "Americanization" is twice as strong among the 16 to
29 year olds than among the 4 5 to 5 9 year olds. However,
only about 65% of the younger group indicated contentment
in adopting American characteristics and mannerisms. [15:185]
Even the German language reflects this formality in the
distinction between Du (intimate form of "you" or "thou")
and Sie (the formal version) . Among white collar business
associates, the Sie form predominates. With only a rudi-
mentary knowledge of German, one can quickly detect the level
of formality between two individuals conversing in German.
A U.S. negotiator who is fluent in German will reap other
benefits as the Germans tend to caucus openly in German at
the negotiating table because they tend to assume that Ameri-
cans cannot speak German. Even if they know the American
does speak German, this open caucusing habit is difficult to
break and much can be learned if the discussions can be
understood.
Spatial relationships are somewhat different in Germany.
While the "bubble of privacy" for an American is generally
about two or three feet, the German often needs a whole
room for his "protective bubble". [16:4] Thus, while a pri-
vate conversation held several feet away from an American
(third party) would not upset the third party, a German third




would have been invaded, even though he was excluded from
the conversation. This concept of "privacy bubble" may seem
inconsistent with the practice of the open caucus and, in
fact, might not apply directly at the negotiation table.
Nevertheless, the U.S. negotiator should be sensitive to this
"invasion of privacy" in other social interactions with his
German counterparts.
German humor is almost non-existant except for regional
jokes and puns. The quick flash American smile is generally
considered to be an insincere gesture. [14:62] At the
negotiation table, expect very little levity. The Germans
tend to speak English slowly and strongly without injecting
any slang. Patience is, therefore, a necessity in negotiating
with the Germans.
Because of the stratification of the German education
system and the close relationship between education level,
employment opportunities, and social status, the Germans
are very conscious of educational credentials. The title
"Dr." commands instant respect whether or not the particular
"Dr." makes any sense at all in defending a position at the
negotiating table. Some implications are fairly obvious. A
Ph.D expert will probably be a great deal more persuasive
than a functional expert who might have had many years
experience in working with the system being purchased.
A "sense of order" seems to be extremely important to
the Germans. In fact, the fantastic rate of economic growth
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since the end of World War II is largely attributed to
willingness of the German people to adhere to federal regula-
tions which tied wages and prices to productivity. Private
firms in Germany will strictly adhere to official guidance
on rates and it is virtually impossible to get significant
reductions at the negotiating table. Non-recurring costs,
however, are much more flexible. Items such as design engin-
eering, testing, and data preparation are likely to have
excess costs built into the proposal. When digging into these
cost elements, it is very easy to get lost in a sea of detail.
Frequent summaries are needed in order to keep the negotia-
tions moving. If minues are being recorded, it is wise for
the U.S. team to participate in the preparation since the
German version often tends to read like a novel with every
detail fully described.
Establishment of an agenda is also very important when
negotiating with the Germans. As they are very sensitive
to limitations of authority, much pre-staffing is done with
higher management levels and with legal counsel. While the
flexibility of the German negotiator might appear to be very
limited, at least the final approval process will be quite
rapid because of all the pre-staffing. Frequent caucuses
will allow the German negotiator time to get approval on any
changes the U.S. negotiator has proposed. But, before a
break, some agreement should be reached on the duration of
the break and the topic to be discussed immediately following
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the break. Otherwise, negotiations will become protracted
and this delights many Germans who feel they can eventually
wear down the U.S. negotiators. Another advantage of the
agenda is to minimize the unavailability of experts, which
is a tactic often employed by the Germans whenever they do
not want to discuss an issue.
Bureaucracy and "red tape" abound in Germany. Because
of their "sense of order" and high respect for authority,
official documents are treated quite differently from normal
business papers. In one case a U.S. negotiator was having
difficulty in clearing the border inspection into Germany
because of the lengthy review of his briefcase contents. To
alleviate this problem, he bought a rubber stamp and marked
his cover sheets "OFFICIAL NATO BUSINESS." The problem
disappeared.
Some U.S. negotiators found that a short working lunch
was an effective means of getting the German's attention
since such a lunch is not consistent with the routine heavy
noon meal. Also, these U.S. negotiators found that the
period just after lunch was the best time to introduce
important issues. At least one U.S. negotiator learned to
handle the very difficult issues away from the formal setting
of the negotiating table. Once a mutual trust had been
developed, private discussions unter vier Augen (literally





In contrast with the German's concern about precision
with the written word, the French tend to be much more flexi-
ble and casual about contract wording. Historically, the
French business philosophy did not stress growth or profit
maximization. Entrepreneurs seemed more concerned that too
much growth would cause the character of the business to
change and would probably affect their comfortable life
style. [17: 335] This conservatism resulted in a slower
economic growth than that of most European neighbors. Also,
the extremely nationalistic policies put forth by Charles
De Gaulle did little to help France economically. Even
today some U.S. negotiators have found that nationalism often
tends to sidetrack the French negotiator who becomes extremely
preoccupied with a single issue which sometimes is quite
minor. If the U.S. negotiator can discover what this "big"
point is, the quid pro quo advantage is potentially enormous.
With regard to differences in spatial concepts, the French
tend to like centralized control with the boss in the middle
of the group. The boss directs all activities and makes all
decisions. [18:201J The idea of dividing up space equally
(the American way) never seems to occur to a Frenchman and
a newcomer to a group must fend for himself until he has
been accepted by the group. The implications of this differ-
ence in space utilization could have some impact at the
negotiating table, particularly if there are several coun-
tries involved (e.g., a multinational cooperative development
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program) . French reluctance to establish common (neutral)
territory could inhibit progress in the opening phase of
these negotiations.
This difference in spatial concepts was one of the many
problems faced by a U.S. negotiator who was negotiating
with the French indirectly. In this case the French were
purchasing some complex target drones and related range
services from the Italians who, in turn, were subcontracting
a large portion of the work to an American firm. Both French
and Italian negotiators were from the public sector repre-
senting NATO interests. The Italian negotiator representing
the prime contractor was there as well. Initially, there
were many problems with seating arrangements which arose as
a result of differences in spatial concepts as well as the
French reluctance to deal directly with the Italians unless
the U.S. subcontractor would be a full participant. Despite
the absence of privity between the U.S. subcontractor and
the French, a completely three-way negotiation session ensued
and the American firm became hopelessly trapped right in
the middle in a sort of whip saw maneuver by the French and
Italians. In this instance the reluctance of the French to
deal directly with the Italians was the primary cause of
the problem. However, if the American had not allowed him-
self to be positioned in the center of the action, he could
have effectively maintained a lower profile during the nego-
tiations. But since the U.S. negotiator had been caught in
the middle, the French expected him to take control rather
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than act as a netural "middleman" which was the role per-
ceived by the American. Incidentally, the Italians seemed
to enjoy having an American placed in the middle to act as
a buffer between the Italian and French negotiating teams. .
Status consciousness runs very high with the French.
Most of the U.S. negotiators found the French to be quite
insistent that the French negotiator have the same organi-
zational status as the U.S. negotiator. Since organizational
structures and titles are quite a bit more flexible in
America (particularly in a matrix organization), the U.S.
negotiator should find out the French negotiator's position
and adjust his own title (within reason) accordingly. Another
ploy sometimes used by the French when negotiating at home
is to start the negotiations at a fairly low organizational
level. Then successively higher levels are introduced to
review the progress and to reopen negotiations when early
sub-agreements appear slightly unfavorable. Because of this
status consciousness, the higher levels will either try to
dominate the U.S. negotiator or insist that the negotiations
be elevated to a higher level on the American side. Quite
simply, the moral to this story is not to start out at too
low a level.
At the negotiating table the French seem to be quite
secretive about their position. On the other hand, some
American negotiators tend to be much more open in dealing
with Europeans than with other Americans. The reason for
this difference was thought to ben an American feeling
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that the Europeans were not familiar with U.S. business
practices and needed a "helping hand". For example, the
American negotiators would frequently reveal target costs at
a very early stage in negotiating with Europeans but would
keep their targets closely held when dealing with Americans.
The rationale for this difference is that the target costs
relate the scope of work and early disclosure helped to explain
the U.S. requirement. Also, certain clauses such as liqui-
dated damages required detailed explanation because the Euro-
pean approach to a delivery slippage was thought to be much
more casual than the more serious American concern about the
importance of meeting delivery commitments. This paternalistic
attitude was quickly revised by those U.S. negotiators who
had recognized that there is an additional cost in being
open and frank if the other side is being secretive.
Negotiations with the French seem to involve quite a bit
of pomp and ceremony according to most U.S. negotiators.
The prevalence of charge accounts and the desire to project
an image of refinement and chivalry result in more social
interaction than with citizens of other European countries.
Emotionalism and theatrics also seem to be more prevalent
among the French. In one case an American negotiator was in
France trying to arrange for the purchase of some very expen-
sive French heaters. Because the French firm refused to
provide cost data, the American made a counteroff based on
"bottom-line" budgetary considerations. When the sales
director stepped in to review the progress of the negotiations,
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he became incensed at the low counteroffer. He immediately
raised his original offer, slammed his briefcase down on the
table, and stormed out of the room. Although the American
was stunned by this outburst, the sales director was quite
calm and rational the following morning and the contract
price was agreed upon at about the same amount as the bud-
getary counteroffer. Whether or not the outburst had been
pure theatrics or true emotionalism, the American could
never determine. But the important point here is that one
must not panic in such a situation. The passage of time
will generally restore the situation to a manageable level.
D. UNITED KINGDOM
The British negotiators are generally very deliberate and
highly skilled. However, many of them tend to overestimate
their skill. Because of this high level of self-esteem, the
British like to take charge of negotiations. This desire
to dominate is entirely consistent with several basic nego-
tiation theories which suggest that the dominant side is
usually the winner. Functions such as minutes recording and
agenda initiation are volunteered for immediately in an
attempt to control the negotiations.
On the other hand, most American negotiators felt that
the, British were very open and forthright once the negotia-
tions began. The British tried very few "games" or tactics
such as those frequently encountered by these American nego-
tiators when dealing with American firms.
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In multinational negotiations some American negotiators
felt that the British would attempt to form a coalition
on the basis of common heritage and language. Some of the
European participants inferred that the British and the
Americans had joined forces against the others. While these
coalitions never materialized, this situation provides another
example of the sensitive nature of multinational negotiations
when several diverse cultural groups are represented.
Socially, the British are quite formal and reserved.
Physical proximity (e.g. , a neighborhood) does not imply
friendship. Due to the stratified social structure, formal
introductions must precede the development of a social rela-
tionship. Because of the high population density, the Bri-
tish tend to ignore those around them and simply withdraw
into themselves whenever they wish to be alone. [16:41]
Such behavior is quite acceptable in the United Kingdom, but
to an American, this withdrawal in the American's presence
could be misinterpreted as the "silent treatment".
Despite the fact that the British and Americans both
speak English, some "translation" is necessary to account for
the numerous differences in terminology, tone, and substance.
For example, the expression "to table a proposal" has exactly
opposite meanings in British and American. One American
negotiator recalled a situation in which the American and
British negotiators talked right past each other on this
point for over a quarter of an hour.
42

As with the French, the British also have a preponder-
ance of expense accounts. The extremely high corporate
and personal income tax rates contribute to this situation
as these expenses are simply corporate write-offs and they
provide the perquisites needed to retain high quality
managers. In any event, the "Pub lunch" or "Club lunch"
are very popular in England. Apart from possible violations
of the "Standards of Conduct for Government Employees", or
other corporate ethical standards, the English ale is quite
potent and could inhibit a negotiator's level of efficiency
in the afternoon sessions. All things considered, most
American negotiators indicated they enjoyed negotiations
with the British.
E. NETHERLANDS
The Dutch seem to be extremely tolerant people and they
sometimes describe themselves as "citizens of the World".
[19:13] They are excellent businessmen with many years of
extensive trading experience. Even today, 60% of the
Netherlands Gross National Product has some connection with
international trade. [19:26] Most American negotiators
described the Dutch as being punctual, literal, neat, and
clean. At the negotiating table they are rather straight
forward, not secretive like the French. Rather than being
philosophical, the Dutch tend to be quite practical. They
like to get things moving and finish the job as promptly as
possible. In this regard, the relationship between the
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American and Dutch negotiator seems to be less adversarial
than the American and German relationship. Some American
negotiators noted that the Dutch seem to really want to
reach an agreement and do not require much prodding in
order to make progress.
Because many Dutch are experienced traders, they are
certainly not "push-overs" at the negotiating table. Most
American negotiators agreed the Dutch were frequently persis-
tent ("hard-headed") and would keep reopening discussion
on any points they were not completely happy about. Still,
the Dutch negotiator does tend to have more authority and
flexibility than the German negotiator and, thus, negotiations
tend to move along quite a bit faster. Like the Germans,
the Dutch do caucus at the table (in Dutch) but do not seem
to care if anyone listens to what they are talking about.
Based on the comments of the American negotiators inter-
viewed during this study, it is clear that the U.S. government
contract negotiator will face many new challenges in dealing
with the Germans, French, British, and Dutch. The negotiator's
degree of success in meeting these challenges depends upon
his level of competence in modifying his successful domestic
negotiation techniques in order to account for cultural influ-
ences on the negotiation process. As to the appropriate
means of helping the negotiator achieve success, a few pro-
posals are presented in the following chapter.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. ORGANIZATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
At present there is very little effort expended within
the Department of Defense to coordinate the negotiations
between various DOD components and the various NATO coun-
tries. In fact, a recent Comptroller General report to the
U.S. Congress recommended establishment of an independent
interagency organization to provide policy and management
guidance and to act as a central clearinghouse for inter-
national industrial participation programs. [20:21] The
DOD country specialists are not in the acquisition community
and, therefore, do not provide any real assistance to the
DOD contract negotiators. Almost every American contract
negotiator contacted in conjunction with this research stated
that negotiating with foreign firms or foreign government
agencies was quite different from domestic negotiations.
Most foreign countries (in NATO) have realized there are
unique considerations in negotiating with Americans, and
have, therefore, established permanent teams to negotiate
with Americans. Because of the broad scope of DOD opera-
tions, a single permanent team per country would probably
encounter numerous difficulties in trying to figure out what
the various programs entail and in keeping up with the heavy
workload. However, a nucleus of negotiation specialists,
to act as chief negotiators in setting up MOU ' s , might be
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a feasible alternative. Technical support could be provided
by the project office. Then, instead of having the con-
tracting support office negotiate the MOU, that function
would be accomplished by a centralized office staffed with
negotiators who understand the language, customs, and
business philosophy of each country with whom DOD expects
to do business.
Even without a centralized office, there should be more
of an attempt to keep all DOD components advised of develop-
ments in negotiating MOU's and contracts in various foreign
countries
.
B. PREPARATIONS FOR NEGOTIATION
Given that no major organizational changes will be
forthcoming to improve DOD's ability to negotiate effectively
overseas, then some means should be sought to improve the
existing purchasing office's ability to conduct these
negotiations. In this regard, it might be useful to hold
mock negotiation sessions with a small cadre of personnel who
are experts in negotiating with various foreign countries.
These "murder board" sessions hopefully would permit the
American contract negotiator to get some exposure to the
foreign environment in which he will be negotiating.
It would be ideal if the chief negotiator could speak
the foreign language. Although negotiations would still
be conducted in English, since English would be the language
spoken best by the majority of the participants, the chief
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negotiator would be able to learn a great deal from the
"table talk" during negotiations. This recommendation is
not intended to suggest that the chief negotiator pretend not
to understand the foreign language. On the contrary, his
knowledge of the foreign language (and customs) would be
a giant step forward in bridging the mutual trust gap men-
tioned earlier. Even though the table caucuses will be a
bit less open, the habit of presuming that Americans do
not understand will take a long time to break.
Based on the interviews and literature search, the
following recommendations are provided to summarize some of
the important aspects of preparation for negotiations
overseas
:
(1) Recognize that the motivation of foreign
governmental agencies and firms will probably
be different from that which is found in
the United States.
(2) Recognize that the relationship and degree of
control of the foreign government over the
foreign firm might influence negotiations.
Employment goals, collective bargaining
restrictions, and profit goals may vary
considerably from country to country.
(3) Pre-staff objectives to the maximum extent
possible so that anticipated compromises
are approved prior to negotiations.
(4) Very "thorny" issues should be deferred and
then reintroduced after enough earlier
agreements set the stage for easier resolution.
(5) Besides these special aspects, all normal
negotiation preparations (e.g., strategy and
tactics) should be carefully thought out




The use of mock negotiations (in lieu of a permanent
negotiating team) has been suggested as a means of helping
the American contract negotiator prepare for and handle the
many factors discussed in this study. Unfortunately, the
efficacy of mock negotiations for this purpose has not been
studied. Clearly, it merits further consideration if only
for financial reasons (i.e., to save money at the negotiation
tables)
.
In looking briefly at the business philosophies, cultures,
and negotiation techniques of Germany, France, the United
Kingdom, and the Netherlands, it became evident that each
country really deserves a separate in-depth study. Such a
study should include an analysis of several actual projects
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